INTRODUCTION
Judges have long employed a range of techniques to motivate the voluntary resolution of legal disputes during pretrial conferences.' This includes child custody and visitation cases, which arise when adults are unable to agree about how to divide the rights and responsibilities of parenthood. A small amount of literature, written primarily by the judges themselves, discusses judicial settlementseeking in the context of these family disputes.2 The author's empirical research has identified judicial settlement-seeking strategies in custody and visitation cases, and points of consensus and controversy among those who do this work. 3 This paper critically evaluates judicial mediation in parenting disputes by asking whether, and to what extent, it is in the best interests of the children involved. It begins by identifying several features that distinguish child custody and visita-tion disputes from other types of civil litigation, and which are relevant to the normative analysis ofjudicial mediation in this context.
Next, this paper describes and evaluates three arguments that might be made against the use of judicial settlement-seeking to resolve custody and visitation disputes. First, one might argue that there is too much settlement and not enough neutral adjudication of civil cases in general, or of parenting cases in particular. Second, one might applaud settlement in these cases but say the efforts of the justice system to encourage it are ineffectual or inappropriate. Third, one might approve of settlement-seeking by the justice system in custody and visitation cases, but maintain that the system's reliance on judges to do this work is mistaken.
The first two arguments can be rejected, but the author argues the third point has substantial merit. This paper will conclude by arguing that facilitative mediation by non-judges has significant advantages over judicial settlement-seeking in child custody and visitation cases. Assigning settlement-seeking to facilitative mediators could greatly improve both settlement-seeking and adjudication in family court.
I. THE DISTINCTIVE CHARACTERISTICS OF PARENTING DISPUTES
The most important feature distinguishing custody and visitation suits from other civil litigation is the doctrinal supremacy of the interests of a non-party -the child. Throughout the West, the legally correct outcome to a private parenting dispute is that which is best for the children involved. 4 However, despite their doctrinal supremacy, children are almost never parties to the custody and visitation litigation concerning them. Although courts and practitioners have developed a variety of methods to hear the "voice of the child," in most cases the child is not quality between the parties.i 8 According to Fiss, it would be better to have pure justice determined by neutrals than to have compromises such as settlements.' 9 In elaborating on Fiss' argument, David Luban distinguished between the "instrumental" and "intrinsic good" theories of adjudication.
0
The most common instrumental argument for adjudication is that it produces rules and precedents, which have public value.21 Litigation may also have the benefit of publicizing social and legal problems. 22 Beyond these instrumental claims, Luban suggests adjudicated judgments are "reasoned elaboration and visible expression of public values," and as such, have intrinsic value. 23 In the specific context of custody and visitation disputes, there is particular reason to be wary of settlements. The child, whose interests are doctrinally supreme, is almost never "at the table" when the settlement is reached. 24 Separating parents may therefore consent to custody or visitation arrangements that are not best for their children. 25 David Luban observes that "two parties trying to apportion a loss are most likely to reach agreement if they can find a way to shift the burden to a third party who is not present at the bargaining table." 26 This theory can be applied in post-separation parenting settlement agreements. Sharing parenting duties while living apart imposes new financial and temporal costs on the adults involved. 27 These new costs might be passed on to the children. For example, suppose parents of a two-year-old child separate and move to towns which are 100 miles apart. They agree that the child will be in Parent A's sole custody, but that Parent B will have visitation rights for a 6 hour period, once every other week. This arrangement is satisfactory to both adults. It allows Parent A to have a substantial block of free time, and minimizes the number of times that Parent B -whom she detests -visits her house. It also allows Parent B to minimize the number of times he makes the arduous voyage between the towns.
However, there is evidence that the child's interests would be better served by shorter, more frequent visits with Parent B.28 Given the memory span and cognitive abilities of a two-year-old, the visitation time would be more likely to foster healthy attachment if divided into three one-hour blocks each week. By choosing an arrangement that works well for the parents, instead of one that works well for their child, these parents have passed the costs of the compromise on to a third party, their child.
Separating parents may also unintentionally externalize the loss of the economic and emotional benefits of cohabitation by passing the loss on to their children. Consider the case of a "traditional" family with one breadwinner parent and one homemaker parent. Apart from 10 hours per week with the breadwinner, the child is cared for by the homemaker. When they divorce, the breadwinner is threatened with the loss of affectionate companionship at the end of a workday. The homemaker is threatened with the loss of the financial benefits of the breadwinner's income. In negotiating a parenting arrangement, the breadwinner asks to have the child spend 25 hours per week in his company. This is far more time than he spent with the child before divorce, and he will likely struggle to provide this much high-quality parenting after divorce. However, his proposed arrangement assuages the loneliness brought about by the loss of his family. The homemaker accepts this arrangement, in exchange for a support award and property division more generous than the law provides.
The settlement is satisfactory to the parents, but may not reflect the best interest of the child, which is probably better served by a schedule more similar to the pre-divorce parenting arrangements.
29 By contrast, a judge directed to identify the best interest of the child would in principle be unswayed by the parents' personal interests. To the extent that adjudication can produce parenting arrangements that are more closely aligned with the child's interests than settlement terms would be, one might argue there is too much settlement and not enough adjudication of custody and visitation cases.
B. Defense
The Fiss and Luban arguments for adjudication have been answered by compelling generalist arguments for settlement. Research indicates that parties prefer settlement, that settlement is more affordable for everyone involved, and that it produces better outcomes, deterrence, and moral education.
30
Carrie MenkelMeadow argues persuasively that a settlement need not be a "compromise" of justice -it also has the potential to create better justice, or at least more satisfaction for all parties, than an adjudicated outcome would.
3 ' To the extent that there is an adjudication-versus-settlement debate, the settlement side would appear to be ascendant. 32 In fact, the formerly polarized debate between settlement and adjudication proponents has largely been replaced by more nuanced questions about 
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"when, how, and under what circumstances" cases should be settled or adjudicated.
Arguments for more adjudication of parenting cases are weakened by the real limitations of the justice system. Given that the existing judiciary is, at best, barely sufficient to handle the small minority of custody and visitation cases which are adjudicated, many more judges would be required if adjudication rates increased. 34 In the absence of concerns about protecting a child, the state has little basis for denying separating parents the rights that that other parents have to make decisions about how, and by whom, their children will be cared for. 35 The fact that parents sometimes reach settlement agreements that are contrary to their children's interests does not mean that adjudication is better able to satisfy those interests. It is notoriously difficult for a judge to determine which parenting arrangement would be "best" for a specific child. It is the author's observation that the keys to making such a determination are (i) knowledge of the parents' abilities to meet the child's needs, and (ii) knowledge of the child in question. Even after a two-week trial, the judge's understanding of a child's needs and interests will pale in comparison to that of the parents.
Most importantly, there is strong evidence that settlement of parenting disputes is generally in the best interest of the children involved.
37 Litigation imposes burdens on parents, which are passed on to their children. It can quickly drain parents' financial and psychological resources, diminishing their ability to care for their child. 38 Litigation also appears to increase the level of inter-parent hostility and the likelihood the child will be exposed to it. 39 Given its substantial costs and dubious benefits, the cost of adjudicating custody and visitation cases exceeds its benefits for many of the children who are involved in it. 
A. Prosecution
The specificities of parenting disputes do not provide a justification to discourage settlements. If anything, they suggest that the present level of litigation and adjudication is excessive for children's interests. However a second possible line of attack on judicial settlement-seeking is that, while settlement is a good thing, the justice system should not or does not need to actively encourage it.
1
The justice system includes not only judges but also other public employees and contractors including mediators.
Most cases settle, whether or not the justice system does anything to encourage this outcome. 42 Settlements may be reached within "the shadow of the law," on the basis of the parties' predictions of what the adjudicated outcome would be. 43 A building or tree casts a shadow without having to try to do so; likewise it might be sufficient for the justice system to passively cast a settlement-fostering shadow. Moreover, settlements might grow outside of the shadow of the law, on the basis of the natural potential of human beings to recognize the interests of others and find creative solutions which "expand their pie."" Court-sponsored mediation might diminish litigants' incentive to negotiate settlement on their own. For example lawyers might see no need to even attempt bilateral settlement negotiations if they can simply wait and engage in those negotiations at court in the presence of the judge. 45 Even if it is true that more child custody and visitation cases should be settled, in some cases the best interests of the child can only be protected through an adjudicated outcome. 46 Examples include cases in which one parent has alienated the child from the other, and cases in which the more fit parent would concede sole custody to the less-fit parent in a settlement negotiation due to unequal bargaining power. 47 In such cases, mandatory mediation or other alternative dispute resolution interventions can be a barrier to justice, regardless of whether they are led by judges or by other justice system workers. in mediation before they can access authoritative decision-making means requiring them to spend more time and professional fees in order to obtain a judgment. 48 The increased process costs to the parties created by mandatory mediation are also a source of strategic advantage to the party better able to bear them, and therefore a possible source of bad outcomes. 49 In the parenting context, this means that mediation-related costs can be an impediment to reaching an outcome which is in the best interests of the child. For example, suppose that Good Parent and Bad Parent are divorcing. Both parties are represented by lawyers, but Bad Parent is much wealthier and has more free time than Good Parent. Each of them is seeking sole custody of their child, and each is willing to fight until their resources are exhausted in order to get it. It would be in the best interest of the child for Good Parent to be awarded sole custody. If the matter reaches trial, the judge will perceive this and make such an order.
In these circumstances, compulsory mediation increases the likelihood that the child will end up in the custody of Bad Parent. This is because each party must pay legal fees and expend his or her own time and energy for as long as the dispute continues. The requirement to prepare for and attend mandatory mediation sessions imposes these costs on both parties, but wealthy Bad Parent is better able to pay them. If the mediation-related costs cause Good Parent to run out of money or energy and give up, the child will be left in Bad Parent's sole custody, or in a sub-optimal compromise. In fact, anticipating mandatory mediation costs might have even encouraged Bad Parent to bring a meritless application in the first place, knowing that he or she will at least get something from the inevitable compromise.so While this scenario does not describe the average custody or visitation dispute, it does illustrate the potential of mediation-related transaction costs to work contrary to the best interests of the child.
There is also a cogent feminist critique of mandatory mediation for family law cases.51 Feminist commentators have argued that the power imbalances and domestic violence found in many intimate relationships make mediation of family law disputes dangerous for vulnerable people. In these situations, rights that would be vindicated by adjudication are often bargained away in mediation. 
B. Defense
Notwithstanding these critiques, the characteristics of parenting disputes offer compelling reasons to accept the necessity of some form of public settlement promotion in this field. Below, this article will review convincing empirical evidence that non-judicial facilitative mediation is a form of family court settlementpromotion that reliably increases settlement rates and produces other benefits.
3
According to legal-economic theory, civil litigants settle when the perceived costs of proceeding to adjudication outweigh the perceived benefitS. 54 However, the unique characteristics of parenting disputes may reduce the perceived cost of going to trial and increase the perceived cost of settlement, leading the parties to the mistaken belief that seeking an adjudicated outcome is preferable.
Good lawyers provide their clients with information about the costs of pursuing litigation to the point of adjudication. However, litigants in parenting cases are often unrepresented and, therefore, lack access to this information.
55 A parent who does not hire a lawyer, and who has never been involved in civil litigation, may have unrealistic expectations about the legal system, perhaps based on television programs such as Judge Judy or Divorce Court. 56 On TV, litigants tell their stories in their own words and receive a decision within minutes. These TV shows make the experience of "telling it to the judge" and getting an authoritative resolution appear much easier than it actually is. A neutral member of the justice system can inform parties about the true costs of proceeding to trial.
Conversely, the perceived costs of settling may be unusually high in many parenting cases. Discussing resolution of a child custody or visitation dispute with an ex-spouse, without the assistance of a lawyer or a third party, may be a very unpleasant prospect. Given the prevalence of domestic violence, ex-spouses may perceive unsupervised face-to-face negotiations, such bipartite settlement negotiations, to be too risky.
58 High-conflict parents that are not actively encouraged or assisted in settling their custody dispute may be inclined toward adjudication, hoping to avoid a difficult task while imagining a glorious vindication. A neutral can supervise negotiations, making a difficult conversation somewhat easier and helping to secure the physical safety of domestic violence victims.
Even if we believe that most parents should settle their custody cases, we should not assume that they all want to. 57. Semple, Consensus and Controversy, supra note 3. These "neutral members of the judicial system" may include mediators, arbitrators, or judges. Id.
58. Domestic violence is present in between 50% and 80% of the conjugal relationships that dissolve before death, and in at least 50% of those which are subjected to family mediation. viewed parents in an English family court in which settlement-seeking was pervasive. They reported that "many parents ... actually prefer to have the court decide, seeing this as preferable to reaching some compromise which they would then resent." 60 Encouragement to settle from a neutral party might be the "nudge" which is necessary for spouses to overcome their anger and alienation and discuss their child's future together.
The best interests of the child standard may offer another family law-specific reason to value settlement-promotion. As noted above, it is possible that parents will settle on terms which advance their own interests at the expense of the best interests of the child. 61 It may be possible for a neutral to encourage the parties to
62
focus on their child's interests.62 One can ask parents to carefully consider the interests of their child without telling them what outcome those interests require. Reminding parents to focus on the child may thus be entirely compatible with the non-judicial facilitative mediation that this paper espouses below.
63
There remains the objection that mandatory mediation imposes useless costs on those whose dispute will be adjudicated, and provides a strategic advantage to the better-endowed party. Two points can be made in response. First, mediation that does not produce a settlement is not necessarily a waste of time.6 It may open the lines of communication between the parties and allow them to better understand their options. More ambitiously, in the vision of Bush and Folger, mediation can "transform the quality of conflict interaction, so that conflicts can actually strengthen both the parties themselves and the society they are part of."
Second, the rise of triage in family court dispute resolution processes offers hope that we may soon be able to promote settlement for the cases which should settle, while fast-tracking the adjudication of others. 6 Family courts across North America are investing in tools and staff to analyze incoming cases, channeling some to mediation and others to court. While approaches vary, cases involving domestic violence and high conflict are usually flagged for adjudication, without evidence of the dissatisfaction of parents with the outcome of 'no order' when they consider that they have invoked the court's jurisdiction precisely for the exercise of its authority in a matter which they find difficult to resolve themselves. wasting time in mediation. 6 8 Triage allows those parties for whom settlement is possible to avoid litigation, without forcing parties for whom adjudication may be necessary to go through a futile mediation process before gaining access to the courts.
The distinct nature of parenting cases provides a strong argument that the majority that ought to settle need some encouragement from a public sector neutral in order to do so. Settlement-promotion must therefore remain a central part of the justice system's approach to parenting disputes. However, as the subsequent section will argue, this does not necessarily mean that it is judges who should be doing this work.
IV. CHARGE #3: JUDGES ARE NOT IDEAL SETTLEMENT-SEEKERS IN CUSTODY AND VISITATION CASES
Having been exonerated on the first two charges, judicial settlement-seeking in parenting cases faces a third indictment. It is alleged that judges, as a group, are not the best people to entrust with the work of settlement-seeking in custody and visitation cases. This section will first review empirical evidence about judicial pre-trial conferences, which does not clearly establish that they increase settlement rates in family or other civil courts. This section will then identify and consider four inherent characteristics of judges that make them unsuitable settlement-seekers in custody and visitation cases. These are: (i) high salary, (ii) ambivalence regarding the settlement-seeking role, (iii) autonomy, and (iv) authority.
A. Empirical Evidence on the Effect of Judicially Directed Settlements
It is clear that settlements are frequently reached within or shortly after judicial pretrial conferences in family courts. A survey of California judges found that 52% of the judges reported that 75% or more of their cases settle in pretrial conferences.
69 A similar Canadian survey found that only 9.3% of family law cases that underwent judicial settlement interventions subsequently went to trial. 70 However, these findings do not prove that judicial settlement-seeking brings about settlements which would not otherwise occur. Leroy Tornquist compares pretrial settlement conferences to folk remedies for the common cold. Those who partake of the remedies find that their colds go away, and may consider this evidence of the remedy's efficacy. 71 However, the common cold also generally dissipates in the absence of any remedy. Likewise, most cases settle no matter what the justice system does, so the efficacy of judicial settlement-seeking requires some demonstration beyond the fact that settlements emerge from judicial pretrial conferences.
72
A few articles have suggested anecdotally that mandatory judicial pretrial conferences increase settlement rates. 73 The strongest evidence is found in a 1977 study, which found that judicial pretrial settlement negotiations increased settlement rates. 74 The study examined the pretrial settlement program introduced by the Toronto Supreme Court of Justice in the late 1970s. 75 With the cooperation of the court, the authors were able to conduct a controlled and randomized experiment. They found that 86.4% of cases in which the parties were required to participate in settlement-oriented pretrial conferences settled, compared to a settlement rate of 68.8% in the control group. 76 However, the preponderance of the evidence points in the other direction. Three major American studies of civil court systems have failed to find support for the proposition that judicial pre-trial settlement negotiations increase settlement rates. Maurice Rosenberg carried out perhaps the first quantitative study in this field, examining New Jersey personal injury cases resolved in the 1960s. Rosenberg found that pretrials neither increased the likelihood of a settlement, nor reduced the length of the trials, which occurred in the absence of settlement, nor reduced the average period between opening and closing of the case. 77 Judicial settlement-seeking was among the topics of the 1978 "Justice Delayed" investigation into the pace of litigation and solutions to delay in urban American courts. The report compared cities with contrasting modes of judicial conduct, seeking correlations to settlement rates among other output criteria. While acknowledging that the data was insufficient to establish a causative link, the authors concluded that "the most settlement-intensive courts are the slowest courts," and "fast courts on civil case processing need not be 'settling' courts." 266 (1958) . One year later, 53.6% of the cases were settling without trial and the waiting period for those which were tried had been reduced dramatically. Id. However, no data were provided in this report regarding settlement rates before the introduction of judicial pretrial conferences.
74. Stevenson, Watson & Weissman, supra note 45 at 600-01. For a possible explanation for pilot study successes which larger scale research fails to replicate, see infra Section IV(B)(2).
75. result was that the court which was most involved in settlement-seeking had the fewest case "terminations per judge" and the highest percentage of civil cases tried. While the "Justice Delayed" and Flanders studies do not rigorously define "settlement involvement" and do not statistically assess the relationship between the variables, when considered in conjunction with Rosenberg's experiment they certainly shed doubt on the efficacy of judicial settlement-seeking in bringing about settlements.
82
A
8 3 Overall, the limited empirical data available does not suggest that judicial pretrial conferences increase overall settlement rates.
B. Attributes ofJudicial Settlement-Seekers
Empirical research and legal commentary confirm that judicial approaches to settlement-seeking in custody and visitation disputes are varied. 84 However, judges share four characteristics that are relevant to their suitability as settlementseekers in parenting cases. These are (i) high salary, 8 5 (ii) ambivalence regarding the settlement-seeking role, 86 (iii) autonomy, 87 and (iv) authority. 8 8 This section will explain why these four characteristics make judges inappropriate for this role.
High Salary
Because judicial labour is more expensive than non-judicial mediators' labour, and because public resources are limited, using judges to seek settlement means having less time available for settlement-seeking in each case. Judges are paid substantially more than most other public-sector professionals who might do settlement-seeking work, such as lawyers or mediators. The judges who hear parenting disputes in Ontario, for example, are paid in excess of $250,000 per year.
89 While a thorough compensation review is beyond the scope of this paper, it is clear that most mediators earn much less than judges. According to a recent job advertisement from an Ontario government agency, a family mediator with a Masters of Social Work would be paid between $53,000 and $80,000 per year.
90
Judicial labour is also more likely than alternative labour (e.g. social worker labour) to require the payment of support staff such as clerks. The use of additional staff increases the cost disparity between judicial and non-judicial family court settlement mediators.
The public resources available for family court settlement-seeking are finite, and are often said to be inadequate. 9 ' In under-resourced jurisdictions, having judges do this work means having only small amounts of time available for settlement-seeking in each case. 92 
94 A family court's settlement-seeking budget will allow more time per case if less expensive non-judicial mediators are used. In California's court-adjunct family mediation program, the median mediation included a ninety-minute meeting with the parties, and fifteen minutes of preparation time.
95
Having sufficient time is important for producing high-quality, durable settlements of custody and visitation disputes. Robinson's survey of California judges found that those who reported the highest settlement rates also reported having the longest pretrial settlement conferences. 9 6 Airing grievances before a neutral mediator is one of the elements of mediation with which participants are most satisfied.
9 7 Even when non-judicial mediators lead settlement negotiations, mediations that are rushed due to resource constraints tend to be less successful. There is evidence that mediation succeeds in large part because it allows parties to tell their stories to a neutral who takes the time to listen.
99 If resource constraints do not allow judges enough time to properly hear these stories, then replacing judges with less expensive neutrals will increase the benefits of the process for children and families. 100 
Ambivalence
Settlement of parenting cases is a worthy goal for the justice system, and it is important to entrust this task to a cadre of employees which will pursue it diligently and consistently. In speaking to a group of enthusiastic family court judges about their settlement-seeking activities, the author was struck by their conscientiousness and dedication. The same impression is conveyed by the few published judicial accounts of this work.' 0 ' Some judges are even willing to engage in intense "emotional labour" in order to create a deep and long-lasting resolution to a family dispute. 102 However, in North America, the attitude of the family law bench as a whole appears to be more ambivalent regarding settlement-seeking. Some judges are not willing to seek settlement, some believe that doing so is inappropriate, and some may only be willing to do so in a cursory fashion. 0 3 While some jurisdictions have permanent family-specialist judges, judicial generalism prevails in much of North America.m This means that judges hearing parenting cases often have little interest in family law, and no pre-appointment experience with family law.
Additionally, many judges do not welcome their assignment to family court. As Andrew Schepard noted, "assignment to the child custody court tends to be at the bottom of the judicial prestige hierarchy . . . . Newly appointed judges are often sent to the child custody court and cannot wait to be replaced." 05 A California judge acknowledged, forthrightly, that "juvenile and family court are the least Ambivalence may help explain why judicial pretrial conference pilot programs using self-selected judges have produced impressive results in settlementseeking. These result have not been entirely replicated when the programs have been scaled-up to service an entire jurisdiction. The reason may be that pilot programs involve the best and most dedicated settlement-seekers among the local judges. For example the Stevenson et al. 1977 study discussed supra, which produced strong evidence that judicial pretrial conferences impacted settlement rates, focused on a newly introduced pretrial conference program in Toronto's Superior Court of Justice.
0 While cases were assigned randomly to the pretrial, test group, or to the non-pretrial, control group, it does not appear that the participating judges were chosen at random from all of the judges on the Toronto bench. It seems likely that the judges who volunteered to conduct the pretrial conferences were more enthusiastic and effective settlement-seekers than the average judge in the jurisdiction.'
09 Variations in judicial aptitude and interest for this work help explain both (i) the success of small-scale pilot programs with self-selected judges, and (ii) the absence of a clear impact when the programs are scaled-up and formalized over a large jurisdiction.
Autonomy
Procedural rules and codes of ethics give family court judges the right to choose whether or not to seek settlement in each case.'1 0 In light of their ambivalence towards mediating settlements, this autonomy makes them collectively unreliable as settlement-seekers. Judicial autonomy is therefore a potential source of inefficiency in the family justice system's settlement-seeking efforts, and a source of confusion for litigants and their children.
While pretrial conferences are often mandatory in family courts, pursuing settlement in the conference is usually not mandatory. Ontario's Family Law Rules, for example, list 19 distinct tasks that judges may perform during pretrial conferences. "Exploring the chances of settling the case" is only one of these.11 2 Several jurisdictions, including New York State, allow judges to do whatever they "deem appropriate" in pretrial conferences, which may or may not include pursu- This permissive language has been defended on the basis that it allows judges to seek settlement when doing so is in the best interest of the child or the parties, without compelling them to do so when it is not. 116 In family law, there is an especially good reason why settlement should not be "pushed" on some litigants. Many intimate relationships are characterized by domestic violence and power imbalance, and these cases arguably require authoritative adjudication, lest the weaker party be steamrolled into an unjust settlement.' 17 However, court systems seeking to avoid unjust settlements in cases of violence and power imbalance generally now use formal screening and triage tools to exclude these cases from mediation."
8 By contrast, the author found no evidence of these tools being used by settlement-seeking family court judges to pick the cases in which settlement is pursued."19 A more straightforward explanation for the optional nature of judicial settlement-seeking is that some judges have no interest in mediating settlements, and this permissive language allows them to avoid this task. Judges, after all, have a central if not dominant role in drafting the procedural and ethical rules which apply to their own work.1 20 It is not surprising that those rules allow discretion with regard to a role that is not universally accepted by judges.121
Whether or not settlement-seeking will occur in a family court pretrial conference often depends on which judge happens to hear the case. This leads to substantial potential for confusion among self-represented litigants in parenting disputes.1
22 If pretrial settlement-seeking were clearly identified as mediation, and if settlement-seeking were to consistently occur in these meetings, then parents 
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might enter the sessions in a more conciliatory frame of mind. Judges' autonomy, and their collective ambivalence towards settlement-seeking in parenting cases, make such reliability impossible when judges are responsible for settlementpromotion. Non-judicial mediators can at least be given a clear and explicit mandate to pursue settlement.
Authority
The final attribute that distinguishes judges qua settlement-seekers is their authority.123 A settlement-seeking judge typically has three types of authority. The first is the actual ability to make an order backed by the enforcement power of the state. In the "one-judge" or "traditional" model, used in New York State and elsewhere, the judge that mediates pretrial settlement discussions will also have the authority to decide the matter should the case go to trial.1 24 Under the twojudge or "modem" model, this is not the case.1
25 Under the modem model, a different judge is assigned adjudicate the case at trial, however, the judge that mediates the pretrial conference may still make various interim and procedural orders, which can substantially affect the parties' rights.1 26 The second type of judicial authority is derived from the parties' perception that judges can predict the legal outcome of a case.127 Litigants, especially when unrepresented, tend to view judges as experts who can predict legal outcomes. Those litigants who strategically assess settlement-seeker comments as predictions of adjudicated outcome are, therefore, influenced by this type of informal authority. Ilan Gewurz describes the impact of legal expertise in a mediator:
The more the parties perceive the mediator's feedback to reflect a possible legal outcome -meaning, the more closely the mediator is linked to that legal structure -the more deferential the parties are likely to be to her intervention..., deference is more likely to occur the closer one moves into the shadow of the law.' 28 The third type ofjudicial authority is moral persuasion.
129 If a judge indicates that a certain parenting plan is best, the parties may internalize and accept the proposition without subjecting it to much scrutiny. People tend to defer to authority figures such as judges. One New York family court judge suggested that the emotional state of separating parents contributes to this deference: Caucusing, or meeting in private with each of the sides, is an optional technique whereby a settlement-seeking pre-trial judge can enjoy increased influence over the parties. Caucusing lets the settlement-seeker solicit information from each party, which can either be kept confidential or selectively revealed to the other party.131 Caucusing also gives the settlement-seeker the power to "throw cold water" on a party's argument, talking down the merits of each side's case.1
32
The power that the settlement-seeker derives from caucusing might explain why many settlement-seeking judges find the instrumental to reaching a settlement, 3 3 and why many scholars find it troubling.1 34 When a judge is the settlement-seeking party in a parenting case his judicial authority may have an coercive effect on the parties. The settlement-seeker might coerce a settlement, by threatening to "punish" the litigant that is more resistant to the judge's settlement proposal.'1 3
The punishment might take the form of an order that is less favourable to the noncompliant party than it otherwise might have been.' 36 In a parenting dispute, this might mean less parenting time or diminished custodial rights for one parent.
"Friendly parent" rules exist in many jurisdictions and may facilitate judicial coercion. Friendly parent rules create a presumption that a parent's willingness to facilitate the child's contact with the other parent is relevant to the evaluation of his or her parenting skills. 137 Because spending time with both parents is considered to be in the best interests of the child, the parent who is willing to facilitate the child's contact with the other parent is deemed to be acting in the best interest of the child.' 3 8 Therefore, the parent who is perceived as less willing to facilitate contact is less likely to be awarded custody and/or parenting time.
1 39 While the friendly parent rule is derived from the belief that children benefit from having on-going relationships with two loving parents,14 0 this is not always the reason for its application. Especially in a one-judge system, the rule also provides a rationale for judicial punishment of a party who refuses to accept a parenting compromise suggested in a pre-trial conference. Parties may be reluctant to raise objections, for fear that those objections will be considered evidence of refusal to facilitate contact with the other parent.
However, judges need not result to coercion in order to influence the settlement process.141 Judges' presumed predictive powers and capacity for moral persuasion are influential, whether or not a judge seeks to rely upon them. In the words of English scholar Simon Roberts:
Courts are places where people tell us what to do . . . judges are such people. . . . Authority is inevitably going to make disputants more disposed than they might otherwise be to follow their suggestions, and be receptive to their persuasion . . . [The] judge is not in a position to discard this authority.1
42
In theory, a judge might adopt a purely facilitative posture which could render her inherent authority irrelevant.1 43 However the existing research suggests that most judges will send some sort of evaluative message during the settlementseeking process, even if that message is simply "you should settle." '" These messages are mere "trial balloons," subject to the parties' critical analysis and taken for what they are worth. They will be accorded deference and have persuasive force as a result of the judge's inherent authority, whether or not the judge seeks or wishes to use it. 145 Amitai Etzioni's typology of compliance helps explain why judges have such significant authority in this context.1 46 Coercive-alienative compliance occurs when someone believes that he or she must do something or else face a sanction. 147 someone complies in the belief that doing so will maximize rewards while minimizing costs.148 Because disputants are likely to believe that a judge will reach the same conclusion in settlement discussions as at trial, each party will perceive immediate settlement as offering the same rewards as going to trial, but at lower costs. Thus, a judge's predictive power can create utilitarian-calculative compliance.
Finally, normative-moral compliance occurs when someone has a moral commitment to the goals of the authority, and is persuaded that the proposed course is best.1 49 The moral suasion power of judges may easily convince the disputing parents that a proposed settlement is best for the child. Judicial authority in a settlement-seeker is powerful because it has the potential to produce all three types of compliance.' 50 As such, judges rarely have to consciously engage in coercion for these combined compliance mechanisms to take effect.
V. FACILITATIVE MEDIATION IN CUSTODY DISPUTES
A. Facilitative Mediation Generally
The problem with authoritative settlement-seeking by judges is that it diminishes the potential for party empowerment and self-determination in arriving at settlement terms. This is the core promise of the facilitative vision of mediation. Part V will define facilitative mediation, demonstrate its incompatibility with authoritative judicial settlement-seeking, and review its empirical evidence base. It concludes that the best way to safeguard the benefits of both party selfdetermination and the rule of law in parenting cases is to replace judicial pre-trial settlement-seeking with presumptively mandatory, facilitative, non-judicial mediation, backstopped by speedy access to authoritative judicial decision-making for the cases which require it.
The premise of facilitative mediation is that the best resolutions to human conflicts are those generated by the conflicted parties themselves. Disputants are therefore given the opportunity to create their own solutions and encouraged to do so.'' Facilitated resolutions reflect disputants' own moral and pragmatic judgments, and not necessarily those of legal authorities.1 52 This principle, known as "self-determination" or "party empowerment," is at the core of facilitative mediation doctrine. respect, trust and understanding that will enable them to meet shared contingencies.1 However, the goals of facilitative mediation are not always so lofty. A modest compromise on a discrete legal or financial issue is a legitimate goal for a facilitative mediation. Leonard Riskin's canonical article identified a "problemdefinition continuum" for mediators. The two poles of the continuum represent two different approaches to defining the problem to be solved in mediation: "narrow" and "broad."' 6 " Riskin observed that a facilitative approach is compatible with a narrow, broad, or intermediate definition of the problem.' 65 For example, suppose a child visitation dispute is being mediated. The noncustodial parent has brought an application seeking an expansion of his weekends with the child. He would like these weekends to begin on Friday evening instead of Saturday morning. The custodial parent opposes this change, and supports the status quo. The facilitative mediator could accept the parties' relatively narrow definition of the problem as pertaining to the commencement time of the weekend visit. Alternatively, the problem could be more broadly defined, in terms of safeguarding the child's relationship with the non-custodial parent, while preserving a stable environment in the child's primary home.
B. Facilitative Mediation in Parenting Disputes
Facilitative mediation appears to be well-suited to custody and visitation cases. As noted in Part I, the distinctive characteristics of these disputes include (i) the likelihood that the parties will have on-going interaction, and (ii) the relevance of this relationship to the goal of the advancing the child's interest.166 Scholars have argued that cases with on-going relationships between the parties are natural candidates for facilitative mediation.1 6 7
Carrie Menkel-Meadow has called for facilitative mediation when the "process may be more important than the substantive outcome."' 6 8 This is true in many parenting disputes, where evidence suggests that the precise terms of the parenting agreement reached are often less important to the child's well-being than is the nature of the parties' subsequent interactions.1 69 Similarly, Frank Sander has suggested that the facilitative process is more conducive to focusing on the future of an on-going relationship, while adjudication and evaluative mediation are primarily about the past. reviewed three other mediation studies, with satisfaction rates between 66% and 76%. 179 In a recent study of California's mediation program, 87% of respondents agreed that "mediation is a good way to come up with a parenting plan" and 88% indicated that they would recommend mediation to friends. 180 Although parties that settle their disputes report greater satisfaction than those whose mediations do not produce agreement,' 8 ' satisfaction with mediation is driven by factors beyond its ability to lead to agreement. In California, for example, the rates of satisfaction far exceed the rates of settlement.'
82 Participants find satisfaction in mediation because of the process, rather than the outcome.' 83 In particular, parties value the opportunity to tell their story to a neutral party.1 84
b. Long Term Benefits
In addition to increasing party satisfaction, family mediation may also produce deeper long-term benefits. Researchers have investigated the extent to which mediation influences compliance with child support and parenting obligations. Some studies have found that mediation increases compliance, 8 5 while others have found no effect,' 8 6 or only a short-term effect.' 87 One study found reduced conflict between disputing parents during the two-year period following a custody mediation.' 8 8 This reduced level of conflict was not found more than two years after the mediation, however the study concluded that the mediation experience may have taught participants to use a "more direct and mutual style" in resolving their conflicts.1 89 Finally, a quantitative meta-analysis of mediation studies found that mediation had a "fairly large positive effect" on the quality of the disputing parties' relationship.1 90
c. Benefits for Children
The potential for family mediation to produce demonstrable benefits for the children involved is very important. Unfortunately, the evidence on the benefit to children is inconsistent. In California, 89% of family mediation participants agreed that the mediator "helped to keep us focused on our children's interests."191 study placed observers within the mediation sessions. One of the attributes which they observed to varying extents in different sessions was "joint problemsolving," a type of discussion in which "disputants ... define the problems underlying their conflict, examine alternative ways of solving these problems, and make a mutual decision among these alternatives."
2 04 This concept bears a clear and close relationship to the doctrine of facilitative mediation as described above. For the respondents in the disputes, there was a significant correlation between the presence ofjoint problem solving in the mediation sessions and the quality of their subsequent relationships. 205 The authors conclude that "one road to relationship improvement, in community mediation as in marital therapy, is to get the disputants to engage in joint problem solving about the issues that divide them. This provides supervised experience in a skill that is likely to be subsequently useful." 206 Even more germane is the work of an English team led by Liz Trinder. Trinder and Kellett studied "conciliation" schemes in English family courts, comparing the mechanisms by which they encouraged settlement in visitation disputes and the outcomes of the interventions. The researchers found a "high-judicial control" model of settlement-seeking in place at the Principal Registry of the Family Division in London. In this court the judge leads the discussions, and lawyers generally speak for the parties. 207 The court in Essex county, by contrast, deployed a "low-judicial control" model which seems similar to mandatory facilitative mediation. In Essex, before any judge is involved, an employee of the Child and Family Court Advisory and Support Service (CAFCASS) leads a joint meeting in which he or she "encourage[s] both parties to speak to one another ... focused on the present and the future." 208 In an intermediate or mixed position were three courts in Cambridgeshire and Suffolk counties. Here, each case goes before the judge as a first step but most are then sent to a CAFCASS-led mediation session similar to that used in the Essex court.
209
The three courts were evaluated according to the number of agreements reached on visitation disputes, and on various measures of party satisfaction. The high-judicial control court significantly underperformed the other two in terms of number of agreements reached and satisfaction.
2 10 The low-judicial control court (Essex) also created noticeably higher participant satisfaction rates than did the intermediate courts (Cambridge and Suffolk).
21 1 This study was a "natural" rather than controlled experiment. The degree of judicial control was by no means the only difference between the three research sites. It does not therefore establish a clear correlation between judicial involvement and quality of outcomes. Nonethe-practice in question to a figurative mock trial. The first allegation was that there is too much settlement and not enough neutral decision-making in these cases; the second was that the justice system need not encourage settlement. The characteristics of the justice system and parenting disputes require the practice to be found "innocent" on these counts.
However this paper has sought to convince its jury of readers to convict on the third count -that judges are not the people who should be encouraging settlement in custody and visitation cases. The empirical evidence about the practice does not even establish clearly that it increases settlement rates, let alone that it accomplishes any of the deeper and longer-term goals which we should look for in parenting dispute resolution. Moreover, the high expense of judicial labor, the judiciary's collective ambivalence about mediation, and judicial autonomy raise questions as to the suitability of judges for this role.
The fourth relevant characteristic of judges is their inherent authority. This authority is a consequence of judicial enforcement power, predictive power, and moral suasion, and it has an effect whether or not the judge seeks to use it. As discussed above, authority in the settlement-seeker is authority not held by the parties, and party empowerment and self-determination are essential elements of the facilitative model. 216 Parents who are following a judge's way forward cannot simultaneously be blazing their own path. The hallmarks of facilitative mediation, self-determination and party-empowerment, are essentially incompatible with authoritative, judicial settlement-seeking. As Frank Sander put the point, "the skills required of judges and mediators are sufficiently different that we cannot assume that even first-rate judges will turn out to be first-rate mediators."
There is a natural harmony between the facilitative approach and parenting disputes, and a substantial body of empirical evidence supports the use of facilitative mediation this context. Every family deserves the opportunity to reach a facilitated and self-determinative solution to a parenting dispute, unless domestic violence or dramatic power imbalance make it clearly inappropriate. This paper has concluded by arguing for a separation of spheres in family court. Entrusting the settlement-seeking task in parenting disputes to facilitative and non-judicial mediators could revitalize both settlement-seeking and adjudication, which are both essential. Thus, while the "mock trial" conceit of this article is quintessentially adversarial in nature, the proposed remedy is a gentle form of restorative justice -a reinvigorated family court, with a renewed and enhanced ability to resolve each parenting case in the best interest of the child. 
